The Euthyphro Dilemma Essay -- Philosophy Plato Euthyphro

The Euthyphro DilemmaIn Platos dialogue, Euthyphro, Socrates presents Euthyphro with a choice Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?Euthyphro responds by asserting that piety is that which is authorise loved or sanctioned by the gods whence impiety is whatever is disapproved of by the gods. However, as Socrates points out, the question poses a dilemma for those who believe as Euthyphro does that effective is revealed by divine authority alone.Now, a dilemma is an argument forcing a choice of two unfavourable alternatives. The importingant point here is that the alternatives moldiness be equally unfavourable. Simply to be faced with two alternatives is non to be faced with a dilemma. To appreciate why each of the options muckle out above are unpalatable for Euthyphro, we need to unpack the import of each alternative carefully.In drawing out the implications of Socrates argument, I stipulate to substitute the word God for Platos gods this change will non affect the potency of the argument, and will make the dilemma more topical and relevant to the innovational reader.Essentially, the dilemma faced by Euthyphro is this If it is maintained that certain actions and dispositions are candid simply because God favours them, then it seems that the distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, is purely arbitrary for no condition can be given why God should favour one kind of action quite than an some other. The distinction is solely a matter of Gods taste, just as it is a matter of my taste that I prefer prawns to oysters. As no reason can be given why God should favour, say, justice and kindness, he might equally have favoured their opposites. In which case ... ...d so, the dilemma has not been resolved completely after all.Undoubtedly, anyone holding a theisticalic introduction of righteousity must find some place for divinely revealed moral commands but it may be that in so doin g the theist weakens their annunciation of the dilemma. On the one hand, they want to say that the question of whether an alleged excess revelation concerning moral matters comes from God is to be answered in the light of our rationally established criteria of good and evil. This suggests that morality has no need of revelation. On the other hand, they want to say that, for the theist, ultimate questions of good and evil cannot be answered away from reference to special revelation. This suggests that, in the final analysis, our reason is inadequate as a source of the knowledge of good and evil. It is hard to see how the theist can have it both ways.